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Foreword 
It is becoming increasingly important to alleviate the environmental and health impacts of 
primary energy generation. A comparison of the costs for different abatement measures can 
provide guidance for the policy makers. This paper provides such a comparison between nuclear 
and coal-fired electricity production with special application to  the USSR. The study is the 
result of cooperative work between the I.V. I<urchatov Atomic Energy Institute in Moscow, 
USSR, and the Social and Environmental Dimensions of Technologies (SET) Project at IIASA. 
It makes use of the methodologies developed for similar studies at the OECD. 
Peter de J&nosi 
Director 
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1 Introduction 
This investigation was undertaken jointly between the International Institute for Applied Sys- 
tems Analysis and the I.V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy. The main purpose of the 
study was to analyze the economic and ecological aspects of nuclear and coal-fired electricity 
production relating to  specific conditions in the USSR [I ,  21. 
The calculations made in the mid-1980s on optimizating the energy balance for the period 
up to the year 2005, revealed that within this time frame the marginal energy resources in the 
USSR will be mainly provided by the Kamsko-Achinsk and Kuznetsk coal basis and nuclear 
power. These sources determine the main scheme of formating marginal costs for other fuel and 
energy types and their numerical values [3]. 
Use of natural gas a t  condensation power plants in the European part of the USSR is supposed 
only a t  steam-gas installations. 
When estimating the prospects for electricity generation in the next 15-20 years, it  is ex- 
pected [4] that the residual fuel oil for the conventional power plants would be reduced several 
times. Stabilization of gas mining will result in reducing gas firing in the power plants as well 
as in the co-generation plants sited in large cities. Gas for new conventional power plants would 
be used only a t  the gas-mining regions. Thus the fraction of coal in the power plant balance 
will be increased. Therefore, a t  present, it may be considered that coal and nuclear power will 
remain the marginal energy resources. 
I t  is expected that the specific weight of coal in total electricity generation a t  conventional 
power plants will rise to  50-60% [5]. At present about one third of the electricity output of the 
Soviet conventional power plants is generated a t  the coal base. 
The goals of the present paper are as follows: 
r to  investigate the ecological problems which have arisen from electricity generation a t  
nuclear power plants (NPP) and coal-fired power plants (CPP); 
to  determine the economic efficiency of electricity generation a t  NPP and C P P  in the 
European part of the USSR, taking into account additional expenditures required for 
accomplisl~ing environmental protectioil measures; 
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r using the same economic methodologies to  compare the results obtained for the USSR 
with those for OECD countries [GI ;  and 
r t o  estimate the economic reserve which could be spent on NPPs for enhanced and ultimate 
safety. 
Environmental pollutions due t o  present-day CPPs in the USSR are examined in Section 2. 
Environmental polluters include air and water pollutants, solid wastes and radioactive discharges 
from CPPs. The problems of the ozone layer and C 0 2  discharge are also briefly discussed. 
Large scale environmental protection measures a t  USSR CPPs are considered which could help 
in bringing the C P P  to  a lower level of social acceptability. It is shown in Section 3 that  in this 
case the specific capital cost of a C P P  would reach a level of 330-500 rub/kW. These figures 
are mainly determined by the cost of widely used methods of sulphur and nitrogen cleaning and 
ash-suppression as applied t o  the conventional C P P  with coal dust burning. In addition, some 
variants including the usage of water-coal suspension, C 0 2  trapping by chemical absorbers, etc. 
are discussed. 
The comparison of economic efficiency of NPPs and CPPs is investigated in Section 4. It was 
performed in the framework of levelized discounted electricity production costs, which permits 
the comparison of results obtained for the USSR with thos for OECD countries [GI. 
The reference calculations adopted in the study for the USSR assume a 30 year life time 
for both CPPs and NPPs and 74% levelized life time load factor. A reference discount rate of 
10% per ailnum is adopted, in line with normal recommendations of official economic bodies 
of the USSR [24, 251 with sensitivity studies a t  5% and 12% per annum. Generating costs are 
also presented for alternative assumptions of a higher and lower life time as well as for different 
construction times of power plants. 
The reference calculations show that  present day NPPs and CPPs  possess equal efficiency in 
the Ural and Middle-Volga regions, but in the West-European part of the USSR there is approx- 
imately a 20% advantage for NPPs. Comparing NPPs with CPPs provided with environmental 
protection equipment gives a 15-40% advantage to the NPP in the Urals and 35-60% in the 
western part of the USSR. These figures correlate with those of for many OECD countries [6] 
and may be regarded as a reserve which could be spent for improving the NPP and its fuel cycle 
safety. 
The levelized generation costs are most sensitive to  the discount rate. Using 5% per an- 
num instead of 10% leads t o  12% increase in the ratio of coal/nuclear electricity production 
costs. Thus, it may be supposed that  market economy conditions applied in the USSR give an 
additional reserve to  NPPs. 
The last two sections of the paper are devoted to  the problems of environmental costs of the 
normal operation of NPPs and its fuel cycle facilities and that  of accidental risk from off-reactor 
nuclear fuel cycles. 
In Section 5 coilsumptions of natural resources and hazards t o  the biosphere due to  NPPs 
with VVER-1000 and the correspoilding nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) plants in normal operation 
are assessed in the natural and cost indices. It is understood, that  a t  all NFC stages, including 
energy generation a t  NPPs, the following resources are consumed: land, water, various materials, 
heat, andelectricity. The land in NFCs is used for locating nuclear power factories as well as for 
storing ore and various wastes and spent fuel. 
The largest areas of land are alienated during the mining and processing of uranium ore since 
a relatively large amount of uranium-containing ore (100,000-300,000 tons per 1 GW(e)*yr, 
with a uranium content of 0.2-0.1%) is extracted. About the same quantity, or somewhat more, 
of alienated land for NPPs depends strongly on the cooling method used. The NPP without 
its cooling system occupies an area of 30-60 ha. This land may then be considered mainly 
as temporarily alienated. Permanently alienated land should be considered land on which the  
reactor building has been constructed (about 0.5 ha). When cooling towers are used for cooling 
the NPP condensers, the land occupied by NPPs is insigilificantly larger, but when a cooling 
pool is used, then the temporarily alienated land is larger by about an order of magnitude. 
For the open NFC the land alienated for spent fuel storage is rather small (about 0.1 ha per 
GW(e)*yr). 
The consumption of water is primarily connected with the need of removing heat mainly 
from the NPP. Water is also used in various technological operations in ore concentration and 
processing as well as a t  other NFC stages. In some cases closed water supply systems are used, 
which reduces the water demand as well as the discharge of various hazardous products into the 
environment. 
The environmental effect of NFCs in normal operations is determined by hazardous chemi- 
cal products, radioactive materials, waste heat, water vapor and condensed moisture, released 
together with liquid and gaseous wastes. Changes also take place in the conditions of fish pro- 
ductioil in the cooliilg pool as well as mechanical traumas of fish and other hydrobionites in the 
cooling and water intake systems. 
Table 5.7 summarizes the data on expentitures for "ecology and safety" in normal operations. 
The components of these expentitures depend essentially on plant location, chosen method for 
heat removal, etc. These account for a wide range of expenses for the compensation of natural 
resources (land, water) used in NFCs as well as for hazards from fog generation a t  NPPs. 
The limiting value of hazards from fog generation was obtained for an  extremely bad sited 
NPP in central Russia. The resettling of 10,000-20,000 inhabitants from nearby settlements 
was even considered. The inaxiinuin value of the damage of the flora and fauna of the cooling 
reservoir (loss of fish) was obtained by comparison with a NPP located near Leningrad. 
The ecological factors of the NFC stages lead to increased expentitures for electricity gener- 
ated by 2-20% depending on the method of cooling the NPP turbine condensers ( the minimum 
estimate corresponds t o  cooling by cooling towers, and the maximum by cooling ponds). This 
corresponds to  the well-chosen NPP site (with no damage from fog generation). A large differ- 
ence in the values is mainly due to allowing for the ecological factor associated with use of land 
and water resources in different methods of cooling the NPP turbine condensers. 
Estimations of accidental risk from off-reactor nuclear fuel cycles are presented in the last 
section. Earlier estimates [32] show that ecological risk from this part of the  fuel cycle did 
not exceed 1% of that  from NPP per se. However, the radical increase in NPP safety (for 
instance reduction of beyond design accident probability by two orders of magnitude, which 
is being discussed now) may lead to  the risk from off-reactor NFCs becoming comparable, or 
even higher, t o  that  from NPPs. For valid progress in nuclear power development i t  would be 
necessary to  invest in safety improvements of the former. The following stages of the  off-reactor 
fuel cycle were examined: uranium mining, uranium enrichment, fuel elements manufacturing, 
spent fuel storage, transportation of irradiated fuel, chemical reprocessing, underground storage 
of nuclear wastes. 
These facilities possess an adequate safety mechanism for internally initiated accidents. But 
extraordinary external accidents like aircraft impacts, etc. may have ecological impacts which are 
comparable with those of high-hypothetical accidents in a NPP. This refers first of all to  a fuel- 
reprocessiilg plant, t o  MOX fuel assembly fabrication and to  enrichment. A way of increasing 
ecological safety is higher mechanical protection for the process areas where plutonium and 
concentrated fission products are handled. Development of more compact, non-aqueous methods 
of spent fuel reprocessing may also help. It was estimated that reinforced shields against external 
impacts in some process areas would result in rising costs for NPP electricity production by 2- 
3%. Therefore, costs for environmental protection for the normal operation of a complete nuclear 
fuel cycle and for accidental risks from an off-NPP fuel cycle may increase electricity production 
costs by 3-23%. 
If these figures are compared with the possible reserves listed above, we see that  for a radical 
improvement of safety of a NPP itself a margin still exists of about 25-55% of present day 
levelized discounted costs of electricity production from a N P P  in the West European part of 
the USSR. 
2 Environmental Problems Relating to the 
Coal-Fired Power Plants 
2.1 Air Pollution 
As known, in firing the fossil fuel (coal, gas, fuel oil) at the modern conventional power plant 
furnaces, a significant amount of substances, such as C02 ,  CO, SO2, NO, etc., hazardous to the 
public health and the environment are produced. In the total amount of industrial contaminants 
discharged by conventional power plants amounts to around 30% [7]. 
In the industrial countries the problem of environmental protection against the hazardous 
effect of the conventional power plants has become so serious that sometimes their efficiency is 
considered as a much less important problem. 
In addition to  the atmospheric protection against discharges of solid particles, sulphur an- 
hydride and nitrogen oxides, some other environmental protection problems connected with the 
operation of conventional power plants have to  be solved. 
Some industrial countries have reached encouraging results primarily due to  the extensive de- 
velopment and production of various environment-protecting facilities and technologies. Special 
attention is being given t o  gas purification systems. 
At present Soviet conventional power plants annually discharge about 6 million tons of ash 
(35% of discharges from all Soviet industrial productions), more than 8 million tons of sulphur 
dioxide (44%) and about 2 million tons of nitrogen oxides (60%) into the atmosphere [8]. Power 
plants are intense sources of air pollution in cities and industrial centers. They are the cause, 
to  a significant degree, of so-called acid rain. 
With the aiin of improving the ecological situation, the governmental research and engi- 
neering program 'LEcologically Safe Power Engineering" is being developed. One of the priority 
directions of this program is "Ecologically Safe Thermal Power Plantn[8]. 
This program envisages the development, creation, and mastering of the newest technolo- 
gies and equipment for opencast collieries, concentrating mills, thermal power plants; ensuring 
environmentally safe burning of the solid fuel and complex utilization of CPP  wastes. 
At present, very strict standards for the amounts of air-polluting products and industrial 
wastes have been legislatively established nearly in all countries. This requires taking special 
measures t o  ensure lower concentrations of hazardous substances in gas releases, including var- 
ious types of traps. 
In the USA for instance, the national problem of reducing hazardous discharges by 6-12 
million tons by 1995 has been set. Further strict requirements t o  limiting permissible discharges 
are expected [9]. 
It should be emphasized that a t  conventional power plants in the USSR there are no indus- 
trial sulphur-trapping equipment and until now only fly ash trapping systems are used for the 
purification of stack gases at the power plants. [lo]. 
In accordance with estima.tions [lo] in the USSR they produce the electrical filters for ash 
trapping, ensuring ash concentrations of 500-1500 mg/m3 in the purified gases whereas the 
developed foreign firms supply various equipment for stack gas purification, ensuring ash con- 
centration as low as 30-250 mg/m3. 
In the industrial countries the facilities for the purification of conventional power plant stack 
gases from sulphur oxides and nitrogen are being widely used. 
In this country no necessary attelltion has been given to the introduction of similar facilities 
up t o  now. 
However, in accordance with the USSR, obligations by the international convention of trans- 
boundary air transfer the discharges of sulphuric compounds in the European regions of this 
country will have been reduced by 1993 by 30% as compared with the level in 1980 [7]. 
In October of 1988 a protocol was signed committing the parties involved, including the 
Soviet Union, to  fix discharges of nitrogel1 oxides at the 1987 level until 1994 and t o  subsequently 
reduce [ l l ] .  
The government program being developed in the USSR of environmental preservation until 
2005 envisages about a double reduction of discharges from USSR power plants [12]. 
2.2 Water Pollution and Solid Wastes 
The C P P  sewage water is also a contaminant. The major part of the discharge comes from water 
treatment and hydraulic ash handling systems. The purification facilities currently used a t  a 
C P P  ensure sewage water purification by 95-98%. However, such purification is not sufficient 
and the protection of reservoirs from contamination is an important problem. 
The other important problem of power plants using solid fuel is connected with ash handling 
systems. Deterioration of the quality of the fuel burned resulted in a sharp increase of ash 
released. At present the annual amount of ash from Soviet coal power plants exceeds 120 million 
tons. As the efficient use of ash (according to 1988 data) does not exceed 15% of their annual 
amount, the area of all ash dumps, operating and taken out of service, exceeds 3500 ha. It is 
known that  the ash dumps are potential sources of contamination of the atmosphere, ground 
and surface water in the adjacent territories. 
The ash dump is full after 5-6 years. To ensure the further operation of the C P P  the ash 
dump has t o  be expanded, which may be by using additional areas, or increasing the capacity 
of the existing ash dumps. As there are few free areas it is decided, as a rule, t o  increase the 
ash dump capacity by raising the height of the dikes, which makes them less safe [13]. 
The state of most ash dumps is far from being satisfactory. Almost all of them have suffered 
accidents, including those with dike breaks, and the release of ash into the environment. At 
present, when attention on ecological problems is continuously growing, such a situation is 
intolerable. Even more so as accidents in the ash dumps may have catastrophical consequences 
and cause serious material losses which sometimes exceed the cost of the ash dump itself. 
An illustration of this situation is the accident in the ash dump of the co-generating power 
plant, near Irkutsk, when the dikes, as low as 10 m, were broken and the pulp (mixture of ash, ice 
and water) flow "passed" more than 3.5 km over the flat countryside damaging some engineering 
and service buildings. All chemically contaminated water flowed into the Angara-river [13]. 
Ash blow11 by the wind from the surfaces of the ash dumps cause dust-storms which deteri- 
orates the sanitary condition of the environment. 
At present there are about 100 ash dumps over a total area of about 20,000 ha  [13]. As a 
rule, dust-fighting in the operating ash dumps is reduced by the irrigation of the ash dump's 
surfaces with clarified water. 
2.3 Problems of Ozoile Layer and C 0 2  Discharge 
In accordance with the Montreal Protocol of 1988 the Soviet Union has taken over the responsi- 
bility of reducing the production of ozone-destroying materials by 50% during the next 10 years. 
The specialists consider that  the role of the ozone-destroyer a t  altitudes of 15-30 km (the layer 
of masimum ozone concentration) belongs to  nitrogen oxides [14,15]. In [15] it is noted that 
NO, NO2 contained in flue gases from the boilers participate in: 
reactions causing exhaustion of the earth's ozone layer; 
creation of the green-house effect (just as GOz). 
It is also emphasized that  the N 2 0  concentration in the atmosphere is continously growing. 
The discharge of C 0 2  produced a t  a C P P  increases the real threat of dangerous changes in 
the climate, resulting in the green-house effect. 
At the Interilatioilal Conference on changes in the atmosphere, held in June 1988 in Toronto, 
Canada, [16] a plan for the reduction of GO2 discharges into the atmosphere was proposed. This 
plan suggests that  by the year 2005 the developed countries should reduce C 0 2  discharges by 
20% of those of 1988. Half of this reduction has to be reached by increasing the efficiency of 
energy utilization and the iiltroduction of other energy-saving systems. The other half might 
be reached due to the transition to fuels wllicll produce lower C 0 2  discharges or by choosing 
renewable sources or nuclear energy. 
In addition to the products of complete fuel combustion and nitrogen oxide, hydrocarbonds, 
soot, having toxic and carcinogenic properties, are discharged into the atmosphere. 
2.4 On Radioactive Discharges from CPP 
It is not well known that the process of coal burning for electricity general and communal and 
industrial heating the air is being contaminated with radioactive products. In coal combustion 
some radionuclides are concentrated in ash. Therefore the thermal power plants may be a 
more serious source of irradiation of the population living at  the adjacent areas than a normally 
operating NPP [17]. The estimates show that radioactive discharges from CPP form the effective 
equivalent irradiation dose higher by dozens of times than the technological discharges of a 
normally operating NPP. 
Specialists have calculated that the average annual individual irradiation doses in the areas 
where a 1 G W(e) CPP is sited vary within the range 0.G-6 mrem depending on the factor of ash 
discharge purification, while those from the NPP discharges are from 0.004-0.08 (for VVER) to 
0.015-0.13 (RBMK), i.e., by 1-3 orders of magnitude lower than the doses resulting from the 
CPP discharges wllicll, in turn, constitute 0.3-3% of the natural background dose [17]. 
2.5 Other Dailgerous discharges 
It must be also taken into account that besides the radioactivity of flying ash there are some other 
harmful chemical carcinogenic products, particularly benzopyrene, as well as non-carcinogenic 
components, such as sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, mercury, lead, cadmium, etc., causing 
other serious illnesses. These discharges are apparently dependent on the type of coal used. 
3 Costs of Environmental Protection for 
Coal-Fired Power Plants 
3.1 Reference Case 
Environmental contamination from coal-fired power plants, briefly discussed in the previous sec- 
tion, leads to  social consequences such as human illnesses, damage to cultural values, irreversible 
processes in nature, dama.ges to  the agriculture, etc. 
In the literature, the notion "damages from contamination" means the additional expendi- 
tures and losses which arise in the national economy as a result of an increase in environmental 
contamination. It is extremely difficult to estimate those damages. For example: the estimated 
damages from the discharges are [18]: 
a non-toxic dust - 90 rubles (per ton) 
a sulphur oxides - 85 rubles (per ton) 
a and those from nitrogen oxides damages are 6-10 times higher. 
It is easy to calculate that allowing for the scale of CPP discharges the total damage in the 
USSR from these three discharge components amounts to about 3 billion rubles per year. The 
combined effect of various discharge components increases the total damage compared to the 
damage caused where they to act independently. 
In comparing NPP and CPP by their discharges, the heating of the water reservoirs must 
be taken into account. The parameters of the steam used at  most NPPs are lower than those at  
CPPs. Therefore the specific steam generation and heat discharges from the NPP condensers 
are about 1.5 times higher compared to the most efficient current CPPs. However, at  a CPP the 
heat discharged with fossil fuel combustion products is present, whereby it is absent at  a NPP. 
For the USSR, the expenditures for the main environmental protection equipment at the 
coal power plants can be evaluated as follows: 
a for sulphur cleaning-up to 150 rubleslkw; [19] 
a for ash suppression-up to 50 rubles/kW; [19] 
a for water reservoir protection-about 20 rubleslkw; 
a for ammonium-catalytic purification-up to 40 rubles/kW. [ll] 
In accordance with available data [12] the specific costs of various types of purification from 
sulphur ranges from 40 to 100 rubles per 1 kW of installed power for the USSR. The operation 
expenses increase by 10-15%. The capital investments for construction of 152 sulphur-trapping 
facilities are estimated to be 4-5 billion rubles. 
It has been pointed out in the literature that the total expenditures for stack gas purification 
facilities in electricity engineering are estimated to be 6-7 billion rubles. The cost of ammonium- 
catalytic nitrogen purification facilities (the first of such facilities are expected to  be introduced 
in the Soviet Union in 1991-92) will be 30-40 rubleslkw. [12] According to estimates [4] the 
specific capital costs for ecologically safe thermal power plants based on fossil fuel are expected 
to be 330-500 rubles/kW. 
These capital investments for coal power plants account for the previously mentioned ex- 
penditures for environmental protection equipment. These evaluations of the specific capital 
investments refer to coal power plants with conventional pulverized coal fuel burning. Therefore 
we take as a reference case for a CPP the following values of specific capital cost (investment): 
a 200 rub/kW for a present day coal-fired power plant without large environmental protec- 
tion measures; 
a 330-500 rub/kW for a coal-fired power plant with environmelltal protection measures as 
discussed. 
3.2 Variants 
In the above study the increase in the C P P  cost was mainly determined by the cost of the widely 
used methods of sulphur and nitrogen cleaning and ash-suppression as applied to  a conventional 
C P P  with coal dust burning. 
Now let us estimate how this situation could be changed if ecologically more acceptable 
methods of coal burning such as using steam boilers with a fluid-bed furnace and if water-coal 
suspension were applied. These approaches were discussed in detail at  the 14th World Energy 
Conference (WEC). [21] 
The fluid-bed furnace in burning coal in conjunction with limestone permits the discharge 
of sulphur and nitrogen oxides to  be reduced. However, the current costs would then increase 
significantly due to  the use of limestone, preparation of a limestone-coal mixture, and feeding 
the latter into the furnace. [22] Besides, it is only reasonable to apply this technology for boilers 
of small and medium sizes. 
In accordance with US data, the use of water-coal suspension requires additional capital 
investments of 20-50 $/kW. Therefore the capability and efficiency of the coal power plant 
somewhat decreases and the electricity cost rises by 1.1-2.3 cent/kWh. In 1987 the cost of 
electricity generated a t  a US C P P  was about 2.1 cent/kWh. [23] Hence the use of water-coal 
suspeilsion at a C P P  will lead t o  an increase in electricity cost by 1.5-2 times. These figures 
correlate with the UNO da ta  reported a t  the 14th Energy Conference. It was stated in the UNO 
presentation that in allowing for damage caused to the environment (atmosphere pollution, acid 
rain, etc.) will double the cost of electricity produced by burning fossil fuel. This figure is 
significantly higher when compared to  the reference case following. 
Finally a few words about the "green-house effect". In the opinion of some specialists as much 
as 90% of the total amount of carbon dioxide, the main "green-house" gas produced in burning 
the pulverized coal fuel at  a CPP, call be trapped from the vent stack by chemical absorbers. But 
then, the plant's efficiency would be reduced from 40% to  29.3% and the electricity production 
cost would increase by about 213. [23.] 
Taking these figures into account, it is easy to  show that only these absorption processes of 
C 0 2  trapping will increase electricity cost even more than in the case of using the environmental 
protection equipment for the cleaning gas from ash, sulphur and nitrogen oxides, and for cleaning 
of CPP sewage wa.ter. 
4 Comparison of Economic Efficiency of Nuclear 
and Coal-Fired Power Plants 
4.1 Method of Calculation 
We perform a comparison of economic efficiency of nuclear and coal-fired power plants in terms 
of a levelised cost per kwh ,  which allocates life time production costs over life time output of 
electricity. This levelised cost can be calculated by the formula 
where T-lifetime of the plant in years, t-time in years, e(t)-net electrical output, c, m, f-capital, 
operation and maintenance costs, and fuel cost respectively, p-discount rate for one year. 
As a rule, a simplified expression is used in the USSR. [25] 
Here I(-specific capital cost, ruble /kW; To-load time during one year, m-specific operation and 
maintenance expenditures, in ruble/kWh; f-specific fuel expenditures, in ruble/kWh. Expres- 
sion (2) reduces to  (1) under the simplifying conditions: 
life time is large enough, then (1 + p)-T -+ 0; 
c(t) differs from zero only for t = 0; 
m, f , e  are constant in time. 
The experience of NPP and CPP operatioil in the USSR generalized in [25] shows that  with 
good accuracy, 
Ii- 
17% = 0.07- for NPP 
To 
and 
K 
m = 0.1- for CPP 
To (4.3) 
These values are officially introduced as normative ones. [24] For the USSR condition it can 
be shown that NPP fuel components are close to  30% of E, [3], that is 
NPP fNpp = 0.3E8 
The CPP fuel cost can be written as 
f = b x r  
where b is specific fuel consumption; I?-is the value of the marginal costs of coal. For further 
calculation we use the general formula (4.1) but with (4.3)-(4.5) conditions. 
4.2 Data for Reference Case 
The calculatioil of the levelised discounted electricity generation costs (specific discounted costs 
of electricity production) for the domestic P P  and NPP is performed in this paper based on the 
following data: 
the numbers of hours using the CPP and NPP installed power are equal and amount to 
6500 hr/year; 
the standard discount rate-p for NPP and C P P  is taken to be equal 0.1 l/year. [24] It 
should be noted that  normative recommeildation [25] suggests using p = 0.1 for NPP and 
p = 0.12 for CPP, thus giving an advantage to NPP, which we do not use here. 
for a N P P  specific capital cost Ii=510 rublelkw, which includes 90 ruble/kW of first core 
loading; 
for a C P P  specific capital cost is 200 ruble/kW without large environmental protection 
measures and 330 and 500 ruble lkw with the measures; the specific consumption of equiv- 
alent fuel is 336 g/(kWh); the coal cost is marginal cost for the particular economic regions 
of the USSR ranging from 39 to  58 ruble per ton of equivalent fuel. Table 4.1 presents the 
distribution of marginal costs over regions in the USSR. In the calculation i t  is supposed 
that  Ii at  a NPP and a CPP remains constant for the regions considered below. 
the life time of power plants of both types is chosen to  be equal to  30 years. 
The results of the calculations for this reference case are presented in Table 4.2 
4.3 Sensitivity of the Results to Variation of Parameters 
It is mentioned above that p=0.12 l/year is the USSR normative value for a CPP. [25] This 
value is twice as large as that  used for West Europe. [6] It may be thought that  the transition 
from a centrally planned to  a market economy one would result in the necessity to  reduce the 
discouilt rate. 
Soine techi~ological achievements in nuclear engineering (vessel annealing, etc.) increase 
the possibility of prolonging a nuclear plant's life time by 50 years. At the same time, new 
equipment of a C P P  for environmental protection may appear to  be not reliable enough and 
result in reducing the life time of the plant. This is why we use two other values for a power 
plant's life time of 25 and 50 years. The variations performed for p = 0.12 and 0.05 l/year and 
two values for a plant's life time of 25 and 50 years are presented at  Tables 4.2-4.10. 
Besides, in comparing the economic efficiency of electricity production a t  a C P P  and a NPP 
is made considering the investments made during the construction of the power plants. To take 
this into account, it is necessary to  know the schedule of expenditures for this time. Particularly 
in equation (4.2) it is necessary to  replace specific capital cost Ii for 
where T,-construction time. A similar modification should be made in (4.1). For a NPP the 
modification (4.6) certainly does not refer to the cost of first core loading. The corresponding 
modification of levelized discounted costs are illustrated in Figure 1. 
The schedule of introducing capital investments represents, as a rule, a monotonously growing 
function or exhibits a sinall peak by the end of construction. Therefore for an upper limit of 
estimating the discounting effect a uniforin schedule of capital investment introduction may be 
taken. It appears that for a C P P  such an estimation offers an additional advantage as it is a 
less capital intensive plant. If the construction time for a C P P  and a NPP is taken to be the 
same and equal to 5 years, the discount rate is 0.1 l/year, the increase of capital investments 
is 1.3 times. The I< for a C P P  varies up to 260, 430 and 650 ruble lkw and for a NPP to  
640 rublelkw. To talie into account the teildency of increasing NPP construction time we also 
investigated the case T = 6 years for a NPP. Table 4.11 presents the ratio of a C P P  t o  a NPP 
electricity costs calculated allowing for equal construction times. 
4.4 Discussio~l of the Results 
The results of the calculations of levelised discounted costs of electricity generation in different 
regions of the USSR by coal-fired and nuclear power plants are presented in Tables 4.2-4.12. 
They permit the following conclusions to  be made: 
Present NPPs and CPPs possess an equal efficiency of electricity production in Ural and 
Middle-Volga regions, but in the West European part of the USSR there is approximately 
20% advantage for a NPP; 
In comparing a NPP with a C P P  which has reliable, high-quality environmental protection 
equipment installed gives (15-40%) advantage to  a NPP in the Urals and (35-60%) in the 
west part of the USSR. 
This advantage may be regarded as an economic reserve which can be used for environ- 
mental protection and the enhancement of NPP safety. Table 4.12 presents the upper 
permissible level of capital cost of a NPP corresponding t o  the equal-efficiency with that  
of C P P  with a capital cost of 330 ruble/kW. 
The above figures correlate with those for some OECD countries. [6] For instance, the 
ratio coal/nuclear is 1.22 for France; 1.42 for Belgium; 1.11 for Japan (discount rate 0.1 
l/year, life time 30 yr). 
The increase of a power plant's life time from 30 to  50 years, which is now being discussed, 
only slightly (1-2%) enlarges the ratio coal/nuclear. 
The results are rather sensitive to  the discount rate. Using p = 0.12 l/year manifests 
5% reduction of the ratio, while p = 0.05 l/year leads t o  (10-12%) increase. It may be 
supposed that market economy co~lditiolls applied in the USSR give an additional reserve 
to  a NPP. 
Allowance for discounting capital cost during power plant construction is in favor of a 
CPP. Five years construction time means 3% reduction of the ratio coal/nuclear. The two 
years difference in construction time (4 years for a CPP and 6 years for a NPP) gives an 
additional 3-4% adva ihge  to  a CPP. 
The data  obtained can be used for a preliminary evaluation of the economic expediency 
of new NPP designs with enhanced safety. 
5 Cost of Environmental Protection for Normal 
Operation of a Nuclear Power Plant 
And Its Fuel Facilities 
The conclusion from the previous section is that for apresent day NPP there is an economic 
reserve which could be used for the enhancement of safety and protection of the environment 
(SPE). The question is whether this reserve is large enough and how it can be used for SPE in 
order to reach a social acceptance of nuclear power. The problem could be expressed as follows. 
How much does environmental protection for the normal operation of a NPP and its fuel cycle 
facilities cost? 
Estimating the economic factors associated with ensuring the safety and protection of the 
environment is complicated both by the common problems of the national economy as a whole 
and by some specific ones. The common problems arise from shortcomings in the development 
and the practical application of economic methods for national economy management in the 
USSR. 
The specific problems in SPE economy estimations are primarily associated with the influence 
on public health and the environment, the possibility of accidents with serious consequences for 
the economy and the eilvironment, the difficulties in separating the reliability and safety-relating 
functions of some NPP systems, etc. 
The above problems in economic estimatioils manifest themselves in the deficiencies of the 
corresponding normative documents or the absence thereof. Therefore, in some cases the avail- 
able scientific approaches are used (this is the case, in particular, in considering possible acci- 
dents). 
When studying the SPE economy questions, it should also be taken into account that not 
only economic factors a.re important in designing, constructing and operating of nuclear fuel 
cycle (NFC) plants, in waste removal, etc. The role of non-economic problems such as radiation 
safety standards, sanitary requirements, NPP siting rules, and so on, are not less important. 
All these are coiltailled in a.ppropriate normative documents and constitute the current basis for 
taking decisioils on all aspects of NFC development and ensuring SPE. 
Most of these non-economic requirements should be considered as limitations on the economic 
estimate applicatioil or, in other words, the admissible changes in characteristics and parameters 
describing the conditions of SPE insurance at  NFC plants. In some important cases there is 
a certain freedom in choosiilg the values of these characteristics. Then the optimal decision 
can be made based on more thorough econonlic studies such as cost-effectiveness or cost-benefit 
analyses. Any normative documeilts which could recommend these methods are still lacking. 
In this section efforts a.re made to  estimate SPE economy in terms of the current normative 
documentatio~l for the normal operation of a present day NPP with VVER reactors and an open 
NFC (without reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel). 
5.1 Co~lsulnptioll of Natural Resources 
At all NFC sta.ges, including electricity generation a t  a NPP, the natural resources are consumed 
which must be allowed for in the cost of electricity produced. These are the following: land; 
water; various materials; primary energy. 
The last two items refer to  the category of reprocessed resources, i.e., produced on an indus- 
trial basis. Some quantity of natural resources are consumed for their production, which must 
also be allowed for in the cost. 
Land 
The land is used for the siting of the NFC's main and auxiliary plants as well as for the storage 
of various wastes, ore, aad spent fuel. Besides some restrictions can be imposed on the land 
when it is used for agricultural and other purposes. 
The temporal character of land alienation should be distinguished from the permanent one. 
The temporarily occupied lands are those which can be restored through recultivation after 
production has stopped, and the permanently alienated lands are those where cultivation is 
impossible for a long time after production has ended and where recultivation is non-effective 
(for technical or economic reasons). 
The data  on the utilization of land territories in NFC are summarized in Table 5.1. They 
are divided into two groups: non-permanent and current consumption. 
The first group includes land where the main and auxiliary buildings, equipment, etc., are 
located (e.g., this is the area occupied by a NPP and its pond, cooling water). As a rule, these 
lands are allocated for the object prior to  its construction. The second group is the current 
alienation of lands for the disposal of barren rock, wastes and so on. The generalized data  on 
the consumption of natural resources are listed in Table 5.1. 
Considering the two components, the following must be taken into account. In comparing 
different productions by the occupation of land the amount of all current expenditures and 
their compa.rison (or summing) with non-permanent use has to  be made only by taking into 
account the temporary factor-function of discounting (as is done in converting these values to  
the economic indices). 
At the head-end of the NFC sta.ge (before NPP) the largest land areas are alienated for 
mining and reprocessing of uranium, or during mining, a relatively large amount of uranium- 
containing ore (100,000-300,000 toils per GW(e)*year a t  uranium content of 0.2%-0.1%) and 
about the same quantity, or soillewhat more, of barren rock. Land is required for the storage of 
barren rock, ore, and wastes. In open-cast mining a considerable part of the alienated land is 
occupied by collieries. 
A large part of the land alienated for ore reprocessiilg is occupied by special tailing ponds 
where liquid wastes (tailing solutions contailling sludge and some insoluble chemical reagents, 
as well as natural radionuclides) are held until water evaporation occurs and then the waste is 
buried with clay and earth and planted for fixing the soil. After such treatment the tailing pond 
becomes the 1lea.d-end NFC stage waste burial. 
At the stages of ura,nium-UFs conversions, isotope enrichment and manufacturing of fuel 
assemblies, land alieilation is negligible anlountiilg to about 0.3 ha per GW(e)*year. 
The area of alienated land for a NPP depends strongly on the condenser cooling method 
used. The proper NPP (one power unit) without the condenser cooling system occupies an area 
of 30-60 ha. This land inay be coilsidered primarily as temporarily alienated. Permanently 
alienated land should be considered as land occupied by the reactor building (about 0.5 ha 
per power unit). When cooling towers are used for cooling the NPP condensers, the territory 
occupied by NPP is somewhat larger but in the case of the ponds cooling water the temporary 
alienated land is larger by about an order of magnitude. For the open NFC, the land alienated 
for spent fuel storage is negligible (-0.1 ha per GW(e)*year). 
Water 
The data  on water coilsuinptioil is listed in Table 5.1. Water consumption is primarily connected 
with the need of remove heat from some installatioils of NFC plants. The largest amount of water 
is spent for cooling the NPP condensers. In the direct flow cooling system, water consumption 
amounts t o  a.bout 15 in3/s and 50 m3/s or 1.3*109 m3 and 2*lo9 m3 per GW(e)*year for 
VVER-440 and VVER-1000 respectively. Oilly a small part, about 2%, is completely lost (for 
evaporation a.nd filtration through the ground for the ponds cooling water). 
Besides, water is used in various tecl~nological operations in ore concentration and processing 
and at  other NFC stages. In some cases, if permitted by the technology applied, closed water 
supply systems are used, which enables water demands as well as the discharge of various 
hazardous products to  the eilvironmeilt to  be reduced. 
M a t e r i a l s  a n d  E n e r g y  Resources  
The total consumptio~z of materials, other than fuel, for all NFC stages is 16*103t/(GW(e)*year). 
The main part of NFC electricity is consumed at the uranium enrichment stage. 
5.2 Non-radiation Effects of NFC Facilities on the Environment 
The negative effect of normally operating NFC plants on the biosphere is determined by: haz- 
ardous chemical products, radioactive materials, waste heat, water vapor and condensed mois- 
ture, released together with liquid and gaseous wastes, as well as by: 
deterioration of fish production in the ponds cooling water; 
mechanical traumas of fish and other hydrobionites in the cooling and other water intake 
systems. 
The liquid wastes are formed in a NFC as a result of using water in various technological 
processes. 
At the initial NFC stage, water is contaminated when it percolates through dumps of barren 
rock and stored ore. The largest amount of liquid wastes result from the hydrometallurgical 
treatment of ore. These are tailing solutions of about 150,000 m3/(GW(e)*year) in volume. 
Protection of the environment in handliilg liquid wastes consists either in the thorough decon- 
tamination of the wastes from 1la.zardous impurities and the discharge of water decontaminated 
to  the permissible levels to  the water reservoirs, or in the use of reversible systems with water 
recycling. 
The sources of gaseous wastes in a NFC are: 
dust production in ore milling and treatment; 
release of volatile products from various technological processes and the storage of solid 
wastes and materials; 
burning of fossil fuel (gas, residual fuel oil, coal) in engines, heaters, and other NFC 
facilities. 
There is a~lother indirect source of environmental contamination in a NFC: these are power 
plants generating the electricity required for NFC plants and burning, as a rule, coal or residual 
fuel oil. The electricity demands of a NFC does not exceed 4% of the total electricity produced 
a t  a NPP. 
However, because of a great amount of waste discharged into the environment by the cur- 
rently operating coal power plants, this source pollutes the biosphere much more than the main 
NFC production. 
The effect on the flora and the fauna of the ponds cooling water in a NFC is only significant 
a t  the main sta.ge of a NPP operation. Therefore, we consider only the NPP and the version 
of using natural water reservoirs (rivers, lakes, bays, and so on) for cooling. They also may be 
used for economic purposes as fishing area.s with natural and/or artificial reproduction of fish. 
A special ponds cooling water may become an object for consideration if i t  is used for 
artificial fish production where the heating of the water may be a positive factor. Such a case is 
not considered here. 
Damage caused by the a.ction considered manifests itself primarily in the reduction of fish in 
the water reservoir and, hence, in the amount of fish caught. 
As a result of constructiilg an object and its operation, the hazard to the stock of fish may 
be caused by: 
total loss of fish production in the wa.ter reservoir or in a part of it;  
reduced fish productioil due to  deteriorating conditions; 
a direct destruction of feed orgallisms and fish a t  different stages of their development di- 
rectly caused by heat generated from mechanical malfunctions in the water intake systems. 
In this sectioil the following data  is used as the initial material: 
a results of long observations and studies carried out in the Kopor Bay in the Baltic Sea (the 
water from this bay is used for cooling the power units of the Leningrad NPP (LNPP)); 
a normative documents and scientific approaches to estimate the hazard to hydrobionites of 
the ponds cooling water. 
D i r e c t  H e a t  Effect 
When the normative requirements to additionally heating water in the reservoir are fulfilled 
this factor itself does not play any significant role. However in combination with the chemical 
contamination the effect of waste heat inay lead to  noticeable ecological changes: growth of 
blue-and-green alga, a shift in the seasoil fluctuations and in ecological equilibrium, etc. 
These negative phenomena are observed actually in the Kopor Bay in the area of water 
dumping from the LNPP. It should be taken into account that the main source of chemical 
contamination of the I<opor Bay water is not the NPP but rather from the industrial and 
agricultural plants of the region. 
With the current standards and rules observed for environmental protection, NPP is not a 
significant source of chemical contamination. This contamination cannot lead to  any appreciable 
negative ecological effects either by itself or in combination with waste heat. The same can be 
said about the radioactive contarnillatioil of the natural pond with liquid wastes from a NPP. 
This is the reason why this is not considered in detail nor are any estimations made. 
Mechanical  Effect 
Water intake from the pond may lead to the destruction of hydrobionites on the cleaning grids of 
water intake facilities (WIF). Plaalkton, spawn, young fish and larvae of invertebrates penetrate 
into cooliilg systems where they are killed or wounded. Larger hydrobionites, for example, fish 
of marketable sizes die directly in the water intake wells. Studies of mechanical malfunctioning 
of the fish population in LNPP, which have been carried out for many years, made it possible 
to make the following conclusions: 
a in the absence of ally fish protectiilg systems a great amount of fish is killed on WIF. This 
causes a significant damage to  the fish catch and fishing industry, stopping the passage in 
the condenser tubes and WIF grids thus decreasing water supply, which in turn, results in 
NPP malfunction; 
a every year, froin dozeils of thousands to dozens of millions, of various species of fish at  
different ages are killed on 1 GW(e) WIF of the NPP, which means that an annual loss in 
fish products increases from several dozeils to  hundreds of tons; 
a the damage caused by destroying fish in a WIF may considerably exceed the amount of 
fish caught loca,lly; 
a the proper choice of water intake and/or use of relatively inexpensive advanced water intake 
facilities inay greatly reduce the damage to  the fish population, caused by malfunctioning 
in a WIF. 
The main source of moisture releases to  the atmosphere in a NFC is a NPP operation. This 
effect is associated with fog generated by the evaporation from the heated surfaces of the ponds 
cooling water or releases of steain and coildensed moisture from the cooling towers. 
Under some conditions favorable for fog generation (leakage of cold air onto the warmer water 
surface), fog may lift t o  a height of 10-100 m and spread t o  distances of 1-20 km depending 
upon wind. Tlle intensity of evaporation from the pond cooling water surface may reach 0.8 t /s  
for a 1 GW(e) NPP. 
As a result of the irrational siting of a NPP and its ponds cooling water, the population of the 
settlements and cities in the fog spread zone proves to  be in uncomfortable conditions because 
of temperature disturbances and air moisture, especially in winter. Besides, great damage is 
caused by the formation of ice on roads, buildings, wires, and so on. Fog on roads increases the 
risk of transport accidents. 
Until recently, this factor was not given much attention in designing and siting a NPP. As 
a result some operating NPPs experience serious difficulties associated with fog generation over 
the ponds cooling water. An especially complicated situation is a t  the site of the Kalinin NPP 
which uses the water from the lakes Udomlya and Pis'vo for cooling. There, the question is 
being discussed to  evacuate the population from nearby settlements if measures are not taken 
t o  reduce the generation of fog. 
At the operating NPP the problem of reducing the fog hazard can be solved either by 
evacuating the populatioil from some of the nearer settlements, or by taking measures actively 
affecting the atmospheric processes, such as: 
a the construction of cooling towers, if necessary, "dry" or "semi dry", which will affect NPP 
efficiency; 
a the sowing of a.ctive materials enabling rapid condensation, coagulation and drop growth 
in clouds and fog; 
a the use of surface-active films preventing evaporation from the water surface. 
It appears that for a NPP under design the problem of the unfavorable effect of moisture 
release into the atillosphere could be removed. This might be ensured by the appropriate choice 
of a NPP siting and/or an appropriate method for turbine condenser cooling. The decision 
must be taken on the basis of a careful examination of economic and ecological factors using the 
methods for estima.ting the effect of moisture release into the air and effective measures for its 
reduction. 
The data on chemical contamination of the biosphere in the normal operation of a NFC are 
presented in Table 5.2. The main sources of contamination are the enterprises at the first NFC 
stage. 
It should be pointed out that the data presented in the Table 5.2 are indicative of a very 
low direct chenlical contamination from NFC compared, for example, with the similar data 
on fossil fuel power engineering. However, contamination is much smaller than the chemical 
contamination from the source due to  the use of non-nuclear energy in the NFC itself. In 
principle, this source can be eliminated if NFC energy demands will be satisfied by nuclear 
power stations. 
5.3 Assessineilt of Radiation Doses for Norinal Operation of NFC Facilities 
It should be noted that a reprocessing pla.nt is, like a NPP, the source of continuous pollutant 
discharges of radionuclides (during a. normal operation). Table 5.3 shows collective radiation 
doses received by the population of the USSR from continuous pollutant discharges of radioac- 
tive substances of NPPs and reprocessiilg pla.nts into the air and water. [26] The mining and 
hydrometallurgy of uraaium indicates the figure of local collective dose less two orders, and fuel 
fabrication by three orders of magnitude than a NPP. Let us compare the activity created by 
pollutions sited in Ta.ble 5.3 with a natural background. If it is assumed that the background 
is r e n ~ / l ~ r  then the collective dose of the USSR population is 2.5 x lo7 man.rem/yr. As- 
suming the general power of USSR NPPs 100 GW(e), which is planned for the first decade after 
2000 (it now constitutes 36 GW(e)), we obtain the global collective dose for the population of 
the country due t o  NPPs is 7 x lo3 man.rem/yr and 1.2 x lo4 man.rem/yr due to reprocessing 
plants. To calculate the upper limit of the local collective doses, let us assume that all repro- 
cessing plants servicing 100 GW nuclear power are located in the same area with 100 km radius 
(this is the worst supposition). Then for the average population density of the country the local 
collective dose would constitute 4.4 x lo3 man.rem/yr. Let us make the same supposition for 
the NPP7s themselves. Then the local collective dose will constitute 1.1 x lo3 man.rem/yr. The 
local collective dose from a natural background into the area with 100 km radius is 3.5 x lo4 
man.rem/yr. The local and global collective doses obtained by such a way are shown in Table 
5.4 as the percentage of collective doses given by a natural background. It can be seen that the 
local collective doses are two orders higher than the global ones, although both local and global 
are very small parts of the natural bacliground. This proves, once more, that  sparsely populated 
areas are being preferred for the construction of NPPs and likewise reprocessing plants. 
Depending on the field of application various characteristics of radioactive contamination are 
used: radioactive releases (dumping) from the plants per unit time, volume or surface densities 
of environmeiltal contamination, man exposure dose. These characteristics are compared with 
the corresponding normative docuineilts (PDV, PDK, dose limits, etc). 
One of the objectives of this section is to assess the damage associated with the effect of 
radioactive coiltaillination of the biosphere on public health. Therefore we use the effective 
equivalent dose SE intended for such assessment. If the collective dose SE is known, then 
damage G determined in lost man-days is written by a simple formula G = g x SE where 
g = 4.6 man*day/man*rem. [27] 
In the present study the quantity SE or G are also used for assessing the economic damage. 
Therefore collective doses, different in time, are added allowing for the discounting function, i.e., 
in the above formula SE denotes, as a. rule, the discounted effective collective dose Sg reduced 
to the plant operatioil year considered. 
In adding time-diversed economic quantities or in reducing them to  a certain time instant, 
the discounting fuilction e-Pt E (1 f (where p is the discount rate, t is the time) is used. 
In accordance with the decision taken above the value p = 0.1 is used. 
In [28] and [29] the figures for collective doses which refer to  VVER-based NPP and are 
slightly higher than in [26]. So, for further calculation, we take as representative, the data 
listed in Table 5.5. This data is expressed in ~ g )  values. The personnel exposure doses are not 
considered here. 
5.4 Method of Cost-Damage Assessment in Ecoiloinic Indices for Non-radiation 
Factors 
In this section, brief descriptions are given of the methods for the assessment of: I 
cost of resources used; 
damages to the flora and fauna of the ponds cooling water; 
dama.ge from moisture discharged into the atmosphere; I 
damage to the biosphere from chemical contamination. I 
The states of the a.bove problems cannot be considered satisfa.ctorily so far. The available 
set of methods, guidelines, or recolnlllendations are being developed and improvement is not 
still acceptable for comnlon use. 
The methods of cost-damage assesslnent described here have been developed on the basis of 
expert analysis of the ma.teria1 a.va.ilable by the authors and [30]. 
Cos t  of L a n d  Resources  
The cost of the alienated land call be determined by some recent normative documents. 
In Section 5.1 it was noted that the alienated lands are divided into two groups: permanently 
and tempora.rily occupied territories. The largest part of temporarily alienated land is occupied 
for a long time (>30 years). This time is longer than the characteristic economic time (t,,, = 
l /p  = 10 years) This means that the cost of the land to be recultivated and returned in 
the distant future, 11a.s been reduced and is close to zero. This is the reason why this land in 
economic assessment is conventionally referenced to  the group of permanently occupied land. 
Assessment of the cost of alienated land was made based on the data of Table 5.6. 
Cos t  of W a t e r  Resources  
In this part of the cost only the water lost completely is taken into account. The water taken for 
cooling the plant components returns to  the ponds. However, its quality may be deteriorated 
due to  contamination. This is discussed in the next Sections. 
The assessment of the cost of the water used is made in accordance with the recommendations 
of Goscomtse~l of the USSR. [30] According to  these recommendations tariffs of 1.15 copeck/m3 
and 2 copecks/in3 for using surface a.nd underground waters respectively, have been established. 
Besides depending on the particular region, additions or allowance to these tariffs have been 
introduced. 
Effect o n  t h e  F l o r a  a n d  t h e  F a u n a  of t h e  P o n d s  Cooling Water 
In this section the dama.ge to the fish economy, caused by injury t o  fish and other hydrobionites 
in the water intake facilities, is considered. The direct heat effect is insignificant if the current 
normatives are observed. Da.ma.ge I' coilsists of two components: 
Yl is the damage caused by fish death, Y2 is the damage caused by the loss of the posterity. 
If a.ny measures on fish protection are accomplished, the reduced damage (5.1) should be 
replaced by the generalized costs Z: 
where IC, Zc are the ca.pita1 and current cost of fish protection, Yres - the residual damage. 
Fish protection measures are effective when 
Here AY is the damage reduced (AY = Y - Y,,,) due to  fish protection measures taken. In 
this case Z < Y. 
M o i s t u r e  Discharge t o  t h e  E n v i r o n m e n t  
The damage should be considered a.s the generalized costs Z calculated by formula (5.2), where 
Ii, Zc are the ca.pita.1 and current cost of the protection measures, Yres is the residual damage 
caused by the factor considered here I',,, = Yl + IT2 where Yl is the damage caused by the 
forma.tion of ice on roads, buildings, power lines etc.; Y2 is the social damage caused by the 
hazardous effect on the living coilditioils of the population. All these values strongly depend on 
the choice of the NPP site and the method of cooling the NPP condensers. 
Chemical  Po l lu t ion  of t h e  Biosphere  
In the first approximation the econolnic damage from chemical pollution of the biosphere in 
determined by the formulas: 
Y = ITa t Yb (5.3) 
where Y is the total damage, Ya and Yb are the damage caused by the atmosphere and water 
pollution 
Ya = yasf Ma (5.4) 
Yb = ~ a ~ k M b  (5.5) 
ya = 2.4 ruble/equivalent ton is the normalizing constant, s is the index characterizing the 
relative hazard of the atinosphere pollution depending upon the type of the territory, s,  is the 
constant depending upon the type of the water reservoir, f is the coefficient taking into account 
dispersion of the impurity into the atmosphere, Ma and Mb are the reduced masses of the annual 
discharge of the contaminant from the source into the atmosphere and water: 
r = a ,  b; A?) is the index of the relative aggressiveness of the i - th kind impurity; m!") is 
the mass of the annual discharge to the atmosphere or water, t ly r ;  N is the total number of 
hazardous impurities. 
5.5 M e t h o d  of  Assess l l l en t  of  Econol l l i c  Dainage d u e  t o  R a d i a t i o n  F a c t o r  
There are two groups of problems in assessing damage to  public health caused by radiation 
exposure. The problems of the first group axe associated with assessing this damage in natural 
indices or, in other words, assessing the radiation risk. The problems of the second group are 
associated with assessiilg the da.mage in economic indices. In the normal operation of NPP and 
other NFC plants the radiatioi~ exposure of the population does not exceed a few millirem per 
year (in most cases significantly lower) or 1 rem per life. These doses belong to  the so-called 
"low exposures". At these exposures the manifestation of possible radiation effects (carcinogenic 
or genetic) hazardous to  lzuman health is of a probabilistic (stochastic) character. 
One of the key problems of assessing radiation risk is associated with determining the 
exposure-effect dependence for "low exposures". This problem has not yet been completely 
solved, either experimentally or theoretically. Oilly working hypotheses are available, in partic- 
ular, the hypothesis (model) of linear exposure-effect dependence recommended by the Interna- 
tional Radiation Protection Commission (IRPC) for use in the assessment and rate setting of 
the radiation risk. 
The present expert a.ssessment is based on this hypothesis. Note that recently IRPC and 
other organizations accomplisl~ed a reevaluatioll of the parameters (risk coefficients) of the linear 
dependence model, based on the new data on radiation risk (including review of the data  on 
Hiroshima and Na,gasa.ki). This reevalua.tioi1 had not been completed up to  now. Therefore, the 
IRPC recommendations currently in force are used in this paper. 
Another problem in assessing the radiation risk is the determination and use of radiation 
risk characteristics. The followil~g fa.ctors nla.ke it difficult to solve this problem: 
dependence of harmful effects on age and sex; 
delay between a harmful action and its manifestation; 
variability of detriment, death or disea.ses of different types and severity; 
competitioil between the effect of ha.rmfu1 fa.ctors under study and other causes, including 
natural ones. 
The generalized cha.ra.cteristics of radiation risk taken from various scientific works are now 
described. There are no recommendations of any regulatory organizations so far. 
General ized N a t u r a l  Indices  of Rad ia t ion  Risk  
The notion "generalized" is primarily coni~ected with the attempt to  describe a variety of detri- 
ments by a single index. On the basis of domestic and world experience gained in studies of the 
radiation risk, two natural indices are proposed: 
generalized iildividual life-long risk R (probability of losing life or health because of radi- 
ation); 
generalized detriment to  health G (mathematical expectation of reducing life-span due to 
radiation exposure measured in man-years). 
The main fields for using these indices are, respectively: 
normalization of radiation risli; 
assessing the damage caused by radiation exposure of a group of people and a comparison 
with other sources. 
In accordance with the linear hypothesis: 
where D is the dose-equivalent, r and g are the coilstants depending on age, sex, organ, tissue. 
In the equal esposure of the whole body the average values of these coefficients are: T = 
7.5 x 10-4/rem; g = 4.6 inan*day/rem. [27] 
The IRPC recominendation uses another radiation risk index. This is the effective dose- 
equivalent DE (the dose-equivalent of the whole body having the same risk of causing biological 
harm as an exposed part of the body): 
where Di is the dose-equivalent to  organ or tissue i ;  w; is the corresponding weighing factor. 
At the I.V. I<urchatov Institute of Atoinic Energy two modifications of the effective dose 
DE are proposed: for norinalizing the radiation risk and for assessing the damage. The latter is 
used in the present work. It is determined by the following set of parameters: 
where gj is the detriment in 1: - th organ or tissue exposure, g = Cj gj = 4.6 man*day/rem. 
Econoinic Indices  o f  Rad ia t ion  Risk  
The econoinic indices iinply the socio-economic damage Y which is determined as: 
where a is the price of the dama.ge (ruble/(man*day)). The quantity a consists of two compo- 
nents: 
a = a. $ a ,  
where a,  and a,  are the objective and subjective prices of damage. 
Compollent a,  characterizes the direct econonlic damage to society, caused by death or 
disease of an individual as a producer of the national product. The average value of a, is 5-10 
ruble/man*day. [31] 
Component a, shows the subjective attitude of the individual to  the risk. It may be called 
the social component which is much larger than a,. I t  is recommended to  use the following 
value for a,  : a, = 200 rubles/man*day. [31] Then a = 210 rubles/man*day. 
Allowance for the time factor should be made taking into account the discounting function 
(see Section 5.3). 
For example, ~ ( t )  is the intensity of the damage (annual damage) a t  time t .  Then the total 
damage reduced to time t = 0 is 
Y = Lrn ~ ( t ) e - p t d t  
The total collective dose, total natural da.mage has to be calculated in a similar way. 
5.6 Su~n~nary  Data 
The summary data on the generalized costs (costs + damage) of electricity production in a NFC 
are presented in the discounted form: they are reduced to the current year of NPP operation 
and normalized to the unit of electricity produced. Recalculation of the capital costs K into the 
current ones is made by the formula Z = pX and the same load factor of NPP as in Section 
4. The summary data on the discounted generalized data is listed in Table 5.7. 
Many components of the generalized data depend essentially on the plant's location, chosen 
method of heat removal, and so on. As are, for example, the costs of alienated land, water 
intake, etc. This is why there is a large difference in their values. 
The maximum value of the discounted damage from the radiation effect on the flora and fauna 
of the water reservoir (Table 5.7) is obtained on the basis of studies by the Leningrad NPP. The 
final representative data on damage caused by fog cannot be obtained a t  present because of the 
lack of the initial economic assessmellt of the costs of measures for preventing this phenomenon. 
The limiting value of damage has been obtained for an extremely unfavourable siting of a NPP 
and for the case of taking decisions on the evacuation of the population of nearby settlements 
(10,000-20,000 people). Therefore, it is reasonable to  ta.ke Z N 0 as the representative value for 
this damage. 
Comparing the figures in Table 5.7 with those in Table 4.3 one can conclude that  the eco- 
logical factors of NFC stages leads to  increased expenses for electricity generation by 2-20% 
depending on the method of cooling the NPP turbine condensers (the minimum estimate corre- 
sponds to  cooling by cooling towers, and the maximum by cooling ponds). 
This corresponds to  the fortunately chosen NPP site (with no damage from fog). A large 
difference in the values is mainly due to allowing for the ecological factor associated with use of 
land and water resources in different methods of cooling the NPP turbine condensers. 
6 Accidental Risk From Off-Reactor Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facil- 
it ies 
Unlike coal power plants, NPPs and their nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) facilities produce practically 
no harmful emissions under normal operating conditions. But in abnormal, accident situations 
the hazardous impact from a single case of radioactivity release can turn out t o  be more harmful 
than the total effects of emissioils of coal-burning power plants over a long time. The accidental 
releases in NPPs and NFC facilities occurred in 1957, 1979 and 1986; their modeling on test 
facilities and mock-ups seems impossible for the present. The estimates of risk from NPPs and 
NFC facilities can only be probabilistic. As in the case of fossil-fired power plants, the estimates 
must determine the cost of the whole set of measures to mitigate the probability of an accident 
to  an acceptable level. 
The estimates of such a kind were used in [25] to  establish the competitivity limits of an 
enhanced-safety NPP. It was assumed that all efforts on increasing the safety should be con- 
centrated to  an NPP per se. This call be justified, for example, by the earlier estimates [32] 
according to wllicll the ecological risk from NFC facilities does not exceed 1% of that  from NPPs. 
However, i t  is not difficult to  see that tlle radical increase in NPP safety (for example, reduction 
of tlle probability of high-llypotlletical accidents by two orders of magnitude) can lead to  the 
risk from NFC facilities becoming comparable with that from NPPs. Under these conditions the 
further improvement of nuclear power safety has to be also extended over the off-reactor NFC 
part. Bearing this in mind we have attempted to represent the ways of increasing the reliability 
of "ecologically weak" points in a NFC and t o  estima.te the scale of increase in the NFC cost af- 
fecting the competitivelless of nuclear power. This section also provides brief information about 
the structure and present; day status of NFC facilities. 
6.1 Structure of a NFC 
Opera,tion of the nuclear power reactors is ensured by a network of industrial enterprises of NFC 
including uranium mines, uranium concentrate production plants, uranium isotopic enrichment 
plants (including productioil of fluorine and uranium hexafluoride) and automated enterprises 
for manufacturing fuel assemblies (preliminary uranium dioxide is produced chemically from 
uranium hexafluoride). 
All of the above meiltioiled facilities are designed to supply nuclear reactors with a natural 
fuel form the so-ca.lled head-end of a NFC. The back-end of a NFC deals with fuel discharged 
from the reactor at the end of the ca,mpa.ign. The main purpose of this final part of a NFC 
is to isolate highly active products of uranium decay from the biosphere for a period required 
for their natural decay. Moreover, the back-end facilities may be arranged so as t o  deliver to  
the nuc1ea.r reactors the secoildary fuel (plutonium and transplutonium elements) produced in 
"burning" natural uranium. Such fuel recycling is a necessary condition for the operation of 
breeders. All the same, in traditional thermal power reactors the burnt fuel contains a sufficient 
quantity of plutonium. The composition of fresh and spent nuclear fuel is illustrated in Table 
6.1 for VVER-1000 Rea.ctor. [33] 
Unlike the head-end of a NFC all back-end tecl~nological operations are performed inside 
a powerful biological shield. The radioactivity of the fuel assembly just withdrawn from the 
VVER-1000 core is 125 inillion curies and decreases to 3,5 million curies in 4 months after being 
discharged. The relatively short-term storage (for 3-5 and sometimes to 10 years) of spent fuel 
is made in a near-reactor pool. 
According the coilcept supported all over the world for the last decades after near-reactor 
cooling the spent fuel is transferred to  a 40-GO/year interim moilitored storage facility. The 
de1a.y in constructiilg ra.diocllemica1 plants 1la.s been a main incentive to  this procedure. The 
radiochemical capacities a.vaila.ble in the world are fa.r from sufficient to reprocess the whole of 
the fuel unloaded from NPPs. 
Even though a sufficient number of radiochemical enterprises were constructed, it would 
anyway be impossible to  direct the produced high-level waste immediately upon unloading to  
very long-term storage. For the first severa.1 decades after being discharged from a reactor the 
fission products have such a high specific heat release that it would be necessary to  construct 
expensive systems to remove the heat from deep underground structures. Therefore, a temporary 
(for 40 to 60 years and possibly longer) controlled hold-up of fission products in near surface 
storage facilities is necessary whether they are "sealed" in the fuel assemblies or immobilized 
in a vitreous matrix after the chemical reprocessing of fuel and the extraction of uranium and 
plutonium. 
6.2 Present-Day Status 
U r a n i u m  M i n i n g  
The method of mining the uranium ores is determined by geological and engineering features and 
can be underground (rich ores, hard rocks, above 200 m in depth) or open-cast (uniform large- 
area deposits, small depth, sufficiently loose overlying rocks allowing the use of highly-efficient 
overburden machines). 
Underground leaching (UL) for poor and run-of-the-mine ores (uranium content of 0.03- 
0.05%) in deposits with complex l~ydrogeological and mining engineering conditions of bedding 
(depth ranging from 40-80 to  450-600 m). 
In addition to  a considerable saving in equipment this method simplifies the solution of 
ecological problems. [34] In particular, the USSR produces 30% of uranium by the sulfuric-acid 
LTL method; in the USA this figure is about 50% . 
U r a n i u m  E n r i c h m e n t  
Productioll of enriched uranium is one of the capita.1-intensive links of a NFC. Table 6.2 [35] 
illustrates the poteiltialities of the greatest world producers of enriched uranium. At present 
industry uses both diffusion and centrifugal methods of enrichment. The great advantage of 
the centrifugal methods over diffusioil consists of not only that its electricity consumption is 25 
times less, but also that the sta.ges of the centrifugal plant during work capture small quantities 
of uranium hexafluoride. This means that the ecological risk will be lower when an accidental 
external impact destroys the separa.tion plants per se. 
For the last 15 years, the USA and other countries have developed a laser method of isotope 
enrichment. By this method separation is not reached a t  the cost of molecular-kinetic effects 
as in the gas-diffusion or centrifugal method, but via selective excitation and photoionization 
of a chosen isotope by monoc1~romatic light of a corresponding laser system. During isotope 
separation uranium is maintained in the vapor state by a special heater. The AVLIS (Atomic 
Vapor Laser Isotope Separation) method does not require the production of uranium hexafluoride 
and, hence, fluorine. This is an ecological advantage of the laser method as compared with the 
two methods now used in industry. The ecollolnic adva.ntages of the laser enrichment of uranium 
isotopes are illustrated by Table 6.3. 
Chemica l  Reprocess ing of I r rad ia ted  Fuel 
The total annual discharge of spent fuel at NPPs all over the world is about 7000 tons. The 
total quantity of spent fuel will be from 120 to 200 tllousalld tons by the year 2000. 
The off-reactor part of a NFC may be arranged in two ways: the cycle can be open (with- 
out chemical reprocessing) or closed (with fuel reprocessing and waste conditioning). Different 
countries solve this problem in different wa.ys. For esa.inple, France which is a densely-populated 
country, has at  its disposal a sufficient reserve of na.tura1 uranium but nevertheless, since the 
sixties, spends considera.ble funds in constructing pla.nts for reprocessing of power reactor fuels. 
The French radiochemical capacities ilot oilly meet the needs of national nuclear power, but 
perform the orders of other countries (Sweden, Japan). 
Japan, having serious seismic conditions in addition to  being a high densely populated coun- 
try, continues to  construct NPPs and creates a second plant for reprocessing of spent fuel (using 
the French technology, 800 t/yr). Only recently, according to  the Japan specialists' reports, 
the negative attitude of the population to the construction of this plant has arisen, whereby its 
start-up may be suspended. 
Germany, in spite of taking the path of fuel reprocessing, periodically delays the construction 
of the plant, as it exa.inines the possibility of reprocessing the fuel discharged from German NPPs 
in France or Britain. 
The USA has decided, for the present, not to reprocess the fuel from power reactors; the 
radiochemical plants which have been constructed are not licensed because they do not meet 
the NRC safety standards. 
Sweden is the convinced antagonist of fuel reprocessing on its own territory. 
The USSR published (before the Chernobyl accident of 1986) the concept of a close cycle 
combined with breeder reactors. The concepts of safe breeders are heatedly debated now. [36] 
Development of the breeder program will mean the ilecessity of constructing new radiochemical 
enterprises producing plutoiliurn for the breeder cores. The Soviet Union has an operating 
plant in I<yshtym to  reprocess the spent fuel discharged from the VVER-440 reactors. It has 
a nominal capacity of about 400 MTHM (Metric Tonnes of Heavy Metal)/yr. The Kyshtym 
plant has recovered about 20 MT of plutoniunl from spent fuel discharged from PWRs (VVERs) 
since 1978 when it began reprocessiilg non-defense spent fuel. The second plant reprocessing 
1500 toils of the VVER- 1000 fuel per yea.r (annual discharge from about 80 power units of 1 
GW) and the fuel of other reactors is a t  the 30% stage of construction near Krasnoyarsk, but 
its construction has now been suspended. [37] 
At the present time the radiation-ecological factors are of decisive significance in choosing 
the strategy of spent fuel management. 
I n t e r i m  S torage  of I r rad ia ted  Fuel 
~ 
Development of interim storage facilities is based on over 40 years of world experience in spent 
fuel storage. Dry (in air or inert gas) and underwater storage of fuel assemblies exist. The 
dry storage facility is designed as regu1a.r rows of shallow dry wells (Nevada, USA; Japan), a 
concrete canyon (Britain, France, USA), a. concrete surface container, called a "silo" (Canada, 
USA) and a two-purpose steel coiltainer in which the fuel assemblies are stored and transported 
(FRG, USA). 
Use of the module methods (containers, dry wells, silos) does not cost much, since only min- 
imum initial investineilts are required. However, the underwater storage of fuel elements is more 
reliable: it excludes overheating and thereby guarantees with a high probability the integrity of 
the claddings. The fuel storage ra.cks in the pools are now more compact and equipped with 
neutron absorbers which enambles alnlost double the initial fuel capacity. Another way of increas- 
ing the storage capacity is so-called rod collsolidation (the fuel elements are removed from the 
assembly and pa.cked more closely thaa during reactor service). 
A CLAB facility in Sweden is an example of a structure for underwater storage. It has five 
(one in reserve) 3000 m3 poilds made in rocks at a depth of 30 m. The total fuel capacity of the 
storage facility is 3000 t a t  an annual input of 300 t .  The facility has been in service since 1985; 
the investments were $ 224 illillioil (1985 dolla,rs). The storage expense does not exceed 1,4% of 
the cost of nuc1ea.r-generated electricity or 20% of the total cost of the NFC back-end. [38] 
The activity released into the ail- and water during the five first years of operation has been 
negligible, amounting to  around 0.01% of the permissible release from a CLAB and the three 
colocated rea.ctors together amouilts to 0.1 nl Sv/year. 
The collective radiation dose to CLAB sta.ff and contractors was between 6,5 and 7,O x 
man.rem for 1986-88, which was about 25% of the expected values in the final safety analysis. 
In 1989 the dose increased to nearly 9,O x man.rem and for 1990 a further increase to 11 x 
lob3 man.rem was expected. The rising tendency can be explained by a build-up of activity in 
plant systems, increased maintenance work, and more staff members passing the dose detection 
limit. (391 
The dry storage facility a t  Gorleben (Germany) disposed in a reinforced concrete building 
200 x 38 x 20 in is designed for 1500 t of fuel achieved a burn-up of 35 GW*d/t. The fuel is to  
be stored in 420 two-purpose containers with 0.4-m-thick walls for about 40 years. 
The project of a 10,000-t dry well repository was developed in the USA. The repository 
will be constructed in Nevada to become one of several regional facilities which will store the 
fuel discharged from a third of PWRs and BWRs until the year 2010. The storage area will be 
extended as required and will be able t o  receive the assemblies (tightly welded inside thin-walled 
steel capsules) with a heat release of less than 1 kW. The time of monitored storage is as long 
as 100 years with subsequent removal. 23,500 wells will form a square lattice with a pitch of 3 
m. The estimated cost of the facility is US$ 289 million. The initial capital investment required 
for the first year of service will not be inore than US$ 35 million. [40] 
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  o f  I r r a d i a t e d  Fuel.  Transportation of spent fuel is an obligatory compo- 
nent of NFC as it is iinpossible to dispose all NPPs, interim storage facilities and radiochemical 
plants on the same site. Irradiated fuel is transported in massive steel casks by small portions 
which are ten times less than the reactor core loading and a hundred times less than the quantity 
of fuel in the regional stora.ge facility. This excludes the risk of a global or regional catastrophe 
even in the case of a most serious transport incident. 
Long-Term Storage  of Nuc lea r  Waste .  Isolation of radioactive waste is the most impor- 
tant problem under study in inany countries having NPPs. Underground disposal is recognized 
everywhere to  be the best inetllod of long-term isolation (longer than 300 years). Some countries 
have already taken practical steps in this direction. Sweden was the first to  put in Forsmark 
an underground stora.ge facility for low- and medium-level radioactive waste from NPPs into 
service in 1988 in Forsma.rk. The cost of the first pha.se of the project (a  network of tunnels 
under the granitic bottonl of the Baltic Sea a t  a depth of 60 in) was US$ 120 million. Experience 
in servicing this system will prove to be very useful in the future for the construction of deep 
stora.ge facilities for high ra.dioactive waste. 
Underground repositories for high-level radioactive waste which may represent either vitrifi- 
cated blocks containing the products of fuel reprocessing or the whole of the spent fuel assemblies 
will be put into service probably after 2000-2010. Such a time gap is explained firstly by a great 
amouilt of survey, design and civil eilgineering works. Secondly, as noted above, a long-term 
hold-up in shallow storage facilities is required until the residual heat release of the fuel to be 
buried decrea.ses to  a.n acceptable level depending upon the heat conductivity of materials of the 
geological forma.tioi1. 
6.3 Ecological Risk Due to: 
The tecl~nological regulations for every enterprise of a NFC are worked out so that, subject to 
these regulations, the concentratioils of ra.dioactive nuclides in the biosphere would not exceed 
the maximum permissible coi~cei~tra.tion. The continuous pollutant discharge levels of the main 
links of a NFC are depicted in Figure 2. 
However, i t  is imperative t11a.t a certain risk exists of an accident occurring both for internal 
reasons (violation of tecl~nologica~l conditions, equipmeilt failures) and due to  external impacts 
(diversion, aircraft impacts, etc.). Let us consider each of the above links of a NRC individually. 
6.3.1 U r a n i u m  M i n i n g  
In the open-cast nliniilg of uranium an iilterilally induced accident can be caused by local 
initiators (collision of vehicles, landslide) a.nd, as in such cases the kinetic energy is relatively 
small, it is clear that no release of ura,niuin-bearing substances outside the mine working would 
occur. On the contrary, the external impact can have much greater energy to  initiate a sharp 
movement of milled rock and to  produce aerosols containing natural radioactive nuclides. A low 
uranium content of ore (0.02-0.2) is the factor limiting the release of aerosols in the atmosphere 
after an accident. 
In the undergrouild mining of uranium an internal accident cannot create an  increased (ex- 
ceeding the background) concentration of natural radioactive nuclides in the above-ground air 
space. As to  the external impact, it ca.n lead to a dusting of the masses of ore hoisted to  the 
surface and prepared for transportatioil to  a hydrometallurgical plant. 
It is uillikely that an accident a t  an enterprise of uranium underground leaching could give 
rise to  a noticeable release of radioactive iluclides in the air basin as they are in diluted aqueous 
solutions. 
The picture of the accident a t  a l~ydrometallurgical plant will be probably similar t o  that a t  
a uranium mine. However, taking into account the presence of uranium concentrate (the end 
product of the l~ydroinetallurgical plant), the probability of increase in the background will be 
lower than in the accident a t  the mine, but higher than in an externally-induced accident a t  a 
uranium open cast. 
6.3.2 U r a n i u m  E n r i c h m e n t  a n d  Fuel  Manufac tu r ing  
A uranium isotope enrichment plant uses uranium hexafluoride as a working medium; a t  20' 
C it is solid with a high vapor pressure (about 80 mm Hg). Gaseous hexafluoride is pumped 
through the cascade a t  a pressure lower than the saturated vapor pressure. When in contact 
with a.tmospheric nloisture solid uranium hexafluoride is converted into uranyl fluoride. If the 
contact occurs in the vapor phase, uraayl fluoride a.erosols are formed. They can be transferred 
by air flows over a great distance. 
Release of the uranium hexafluoride can take place in depressurized vacuum-tight commu- 
nications and sepa.ration machines. But i t  will be of a local nature and not lead t o  exceeding 
the natural background beyond the production area. 
It should be noted that withill the separatioil plants there are neither explosive nor com- 
bustible substance in quantities capable of producing a serious explosion and, therefore, an 
internally-initiated accident is hardly probable. 
I11 the case of externally-initiated depressurized separation equipment and tecl~nological com- 
municatioils it is necessa.ry to  allow for a softening factor, such as a small absolute quantity of 
uranium hexafluoride available in the separatioil cascade. In particular, it is true for a centrifu- 
gal facility. It is kilown that great quantities of solid uranium hexafluoride are available only 
in special standard vessels of the condensation-evaporation installatioils a t  three points of the 
casca.de: feed, product collection and collectioil of dump. Making the assumption that  20 t of 
uranium hemfluoride (approximately a daily reserve) is available at  the same time in a plant 
with a capacity of 1 million separation work units (SWU) per year, i t  is possible to estimate 
the coilcentratioil of uraayl fluoride a.erosols in the air basin around the plant provided that the 
whole uranium 1~exa.fluoride is released from cylinders due to  an emergency external impact. 
The approsinlated estimation shows that in this case the concentration of uranium (in aerosol 
form) in the air space within the 10 kin ra.dius around the plant can be lo3 t o  10' times higher 
tlla,n the maximuill permissible concentration. Such a situation should be considered to  be 
very serious, but not unavoidable. It is required merely to ensure protection ( a  thick reinforced 
concrete ceiling, etc.) a.nd miililnize the risk of damage to the cylinders. 
The consequence of a hypothetical accident to  a plant fabricating fuel elements and assemblies 
depend not oilly on the force of the impact, but also on the fuel composition. The explosion 
caused by a.ny violation of the fabrication process is hardly probable. Dusting of nuclear fuel 
in the air space arouild the plant could occur only after an extremely strong external impact 
(aircraft impact follo~ved by fire, etc.). This is a very unprobable event. Nevertheless if it takes 
place, dusting of plutonium-containing fuel will aggravate the ecological situation more seriously 
than in the case of fuel based only on enriched uranium. This is explained in that  the specific 
activity of plutonium-239 is higher by several orders of magnitude than that of uranium-235. 
6.3.3 T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  of I r r a d i a t e d  Fuel 
The assessment of the risk from transporting irradiated fuel can be broken down into two issues: 
the probability of a transport incident and the scale of consequences caused by this incident. 
During its transportation the fuel is in the power of other departments which are not always 
competent in handling radioactive materials. A casual concurrence of circumstances can take 
place, such as the rail disasters in the USSR which occurred in Arzamas (1988) and Bashkiria 
(1989). 
The fuel trailsport casks are designed ta.king these circumstances into consideration. Trans- 
portation of irradiated fuel must possess an inherent safety guaranteed by the construction of 
the cask. Protection is ensured: 
from the spontaneous chain reaction (SCR) by a suitable geometry and the use of neutron 
absorbers; 
from overheating by passive means of heat removal; 
from the biological effects of radiation as well as from external impacts by a 0.4-m-thick 
steel wall, a massive cover and a reliable seal. 
Irradiated fuel 11a.s been transported all over the world for a long time and thousands of ship- 
ments of gas- and water-filled casks with spent nuclear fuel have been transported t o  distances 
of 100 to  4000 km. No serious incidents with radioactivity releases have occurred. Experience 
shows that the transportation of irradiated nuclear fuel is one of the safest among the trans- 
portation of other hazardous freights. Some cases with the "sweeping" of radioactive nuclides 
on the surface of the cask filled with irra.dia.ted fuel are available in the literature. [41] This 
can lead to  the contamination of ra.ilways or motor roads. However, such a phenomenon can be 
evidently avoided by more careful loading operations and appropriate control. 
According to a.ssessments [42,43] and taking into account the extra strength of the cask it is 
possible t o  assume t11a.t only an incident of estreme severity ( a  shock velocity of more than 110 
km/h, a fire longer t11a.n 1 hour) call represent a hazard to  the transport cask. If we suppose 
that two casks per da,y are conveyed along a 5000 km route (which corresponds t o  the Soviet 
geography aad a Soviet nuclear capa.city of 100 GW planned in the period after the year 2000), 
then such an estreme incident would not occur more frequently than once in a million years. It 
should be noted that the probability of an accident occurring in transporting irradiated fuel is 10 
times less than that of a high-hypothetical accident in an ultimate safety NPP reactor causing 
damage to the reactor vessel and the possible release of radioactivity into the environment. 
For a 500 km route (Western Europe) the probability of an exceptional incident will be 10 
times lower, or once in 10 million years. 
It follows froin the estiination made for a ca.sk containing 3.2 t of irradiated fuel for 150 days 
cooling time, t11a.t an exceptional accident involving a fire can cause the cladding rupture for 
10% of the fuel elements a.nd the complete loss of the coolant. As a result, 1.9 x lo3 Ci from 
Kr-85, 0.01 Ci from J-131 and 130 Ci from the sum of fission products will be released into the 
atmosphere. The Kr-85 cumulative (whole-body) absorbed dose of about 0.4 man.rem can be 
obtained by lo6 persons, if the population density is accepted to  be 4 x lo3 people per sq. km. 
The population will obtain an average dose of 0.4 rem at  a distance of 50 m from the cask on 
the leeward side. The heavily-contamina.ted ground will reach about 300 sq. m. The local (an 
area of 100 kin radius) collective dose due to this accident is 0.4 x lo-" man*rem/GW(e)yr. 
6.3.4 I n t e r i m  S torage  of I r rad ia ted  Fuel 
An autonomous interim stora.ge facility is the place where a great mass (up to  3000 t )  of irradi- 
ated fuel can be accumulated. The design and engineered features ensure an inherent safety via 
the elimination of such factors as the cllain reaction of fission and the overheating of the fuel 
elements during their storage. Thus, ally internally-initiated accident is practically excluded pro- 
vided that the storage operating rules are observed. When the external factors (aircraft impact, 
bombardment) occur, the environmental coiltamination can be so considerable that the evacu- 
ation of the population will be necessary. Therefore, the structure of the storage facility must 
guarantee the fuel integrity under extreme conditions. The above mentioned Swedish repository 
CLAB which is constructed 30 meters down in the bedrock is an example of a successful decision. 
The dry storage facility with pits designed in the USA (Nevada) is an example of a structure 
not uilprotected from extreme external impacts. But in this case the risk is minimized, as can 
be concluded, by fuel dispersal over a large area to attain a density of 40 kg of fuel per square 
kilometer of ground surface. Nevertheless, some events, such as aircraft impacts, can lead to 
several hundreds of kilograms of fuel being released from the capsules onto the ground surface 
and approximately lo3-lo5 Ci of radioactivity being converted into aerosols. 
6.3.5 Chemica l  Reprocess ing of I r rad ia ted  Fuel 
A plant for chemical reprocessing of fuel is also designed on the basis of the required inherent 
(deep subcriticality first of all) safety. The first plants constructed in a hurry for military 
purposes may have imperfect equipmeilt and this is the most likely explanation for the failure 
of the cooling system in a ta.nk conta.ining the solution of fission products a t  the Kyshtym plant 
in 1957, which caused these products to be released into the atmosphere. [44] The internally- 
initiated accident at a. present day ra.cliochemica1 plant seems to  be scarcely probable. 
The up-to-date ra.clioclzemica1 extra.ction plant, or more precisely its basic process equipment, 
is adequately protected from external impacts: it is positioned in the chain of underground 
reinforced concrete "canyons" serving as a biological shield. The volume of the basic equipment 
is comparatively small and the release of high-level solutions cannot give rise t o  serious off-site 
consequences. The tanks for storing highly-active liquid waste are a higher hazard. The total 
capacity of the tanks a t  the plant is 1000-3000 cub.m. The total activity of the stored solution 
is lo7-lo9 Ci. In the case of aircraft impa.cts or diversion the release into the air basin can 
approach the same as in Kyshtym (2 x lo6 Ci) a.nd Chernobyl (5 x lo7 Ci). The most efficient 
way of minimizing such a hazard is to construct sufficiently deep underground reservoirs. 
At present the potential ecological hazard from the pla.nts for chemical reprocessing of fuel 
is one of the main reasons that sonle countries cease their construction. The other obstacle may 
actually be of small benefit as compa.red with the complete fuel cycle. While such a concept 
cannot hinder the developmeilt of nuclear power based on thermal reactors, in the future it 
can become an obstacle to  the development of a wide-scale breeder program. The concept 
of temporary stora.ge now adopted represents a compromise between the supporters and the 
opponents of the spent fuel recycle. It provides time to improve the technology of spent fuel 
reprocessing without which the breeder ca.nnot exist. 
6.4 Qualitative Classificatioil of Accidental Risk 
The degree of ha.za.rd to  the nea.rby population due to an accident which has taken place is 
different for each cha.in of NFC. It seeins t o  us tl1a.t the following scale would be useful to  assess 
qualitatively the degree of risk in accidents which can lead to  the release of radioactive nuclides 
into the biosphere: 
1. Low risk: the ra.dia.tion due to  the release of radioactive nuclides approaching the natural 
background level; 
2. Medium risk: the accident radiation slightly exceeds the ra.diation background and there 
is some anxiety by the population; 
3. High risk: the accident radiation strongly exceeds the radiation background and evacuation 
of the population is required. 
According to this scale the ecological risk in the case of an accident a t  any link of NFC can 
be estimated as shown in Table 6.4. 
The proposed estimation does not pretend to  be accurate, but might illustrate the measure 
of hazard in the case of an accident being initiated at  one or another enterprise of NFC. 
6.5 Estixllatioil of Cost of Measures to Reduce Accidental Risk 
The given discussioll of the after-effects of hypothetical accidents a t  NFC facilities and their 
normal operation makes it possible to reach the following conclusions: 
The present day state of safety of NPPs and that of NFC facilities of the off-reactor part is 
such that the ecological risk of the latter is as low as a percentage of the total. The radical 
increase in NPP safety (lowering the probability of high-hypothetical accidents by two or 
three orders of magnitude) will lead to the risk due to  NFC facilities being comparable 
with that  from a NPP; 
The present day facilities of a NFC possess adequate sa-fety not only under normal oper- 
ating conditions, but a.lso in interna.lly-initiated accidents; 
The extraordina.ry external effects (aircraft impact, diversion, etc.) can lead to a non- 
catastrophic worseiling of the ecological situation in the vicinity of the enterprises, such 
as urailiuln open casts, uranium enrichment plants, plants for fuel assembly fabrication, 
shallow storage facilities for spent fuel. Taking into account that these facilities have fea- 
tures engineered a.t eliininating the spontaneous chain reaction and the means for adequate 
heat remova.1 from nuclear ma.terials, the ecological consequences of the accident will be 
essentially weaker than from a high-hypothetical accident a t  a NPP reactor. 
The accident initia.ted by the above causes a t  a present day plant for reprocessing ir- 
ra.dia.ted fuel can evidently 1la.ve an ecological impact comparable with that due to  a 
high-hypothetical accident at  a NPP reactor. 
The wa.ys of increa.sing the ecological safety of NFC facilities are the use of strong mechan- 
ical protection for the process areas where plutonium and concentrated fission products 
are handled as well as for underground storage reservoirs containing high-level liquid waste 
a.nd the development of compact, non-aqueous methods of reprocessing spent fuel. 
According to  rough estima.tions the constructioil of an additional reinforced concrete shield 
in some process axeas will increase the total capital expenditures for the plant by 10-20% 
. The shield might be needed a t  plants for uranium enrichment, fuel assembly fabrication 
and reprocessing of spent fuel. The costs of the three components of a NFC amount to  
about 60% of the tota.1 cost of the NFC. If the capital expenditures are assumed to  be half 
of the cost of the whole process stage, then the additional shield will lead to  an increase 
in the total cost of the NFC by (10 - 20) x 0.6 x 0.5 = 6-9%. Bearing in mind that 
the contribution of the NFC to the price of generated electricity is approximately a third, 
it is possible to conclude t11a.t the a.bove measures will cause an increase in the cost of 
electricity by 2-3%. 
Conclusion 
In this paper some economic aspects of ecological risk due to electricity production from coal- 
fired power plants and nuclear power plants are investigated which relate to  specific conditions 
in the USSR. These conditions are mainly determined by the Chernobyl nuclear power plant 
disaster which caused many people to be skeptical and even hateful towards nuclear power. This 
is a picture similar to  tlle one in tlle USA a.fter the "Three Mile Island Accident". But in the 
USSR a peculiarity appears which is caused by social changes in the country. This agitates the 
public's perception of nuclear power as all of the negative information associated with nuclear 
industry which was previously hidden, suddenly fell on the public. At the same time the policy 
of openness in the mass media resulted in very strong public concern about pollution due to 
organic fuel fired power plants, which indeed in some areas of the USSR, are several times higher 
than present day sanita.ry limits. These obstacles make it llecessary to reconsider the strategy 
of power generation in the country. 
At present nuclear power plant safety and, particularly, safety as regards hypothetical ac- 
cidents, has become the central problem determining the future of nuclear power development 
PI. 
The development of safer new nuclear reactors both in the USSR and abroad, which could 
satisfy the requireillents of enhanced and ultimate safety, could be regarded as the answer to  
this challenge of the community engaged in nuclear power. At present there is a wide spectrum 
of improved designs and suggestions on both the old and new reactor types. [2] 
It seems obvious (particularly relative to the conventional directions in reactor designing) 
that enhancement of NPP safety would inevitably result in the essential increase of their costs. 
The question is to what extent this cost increase could be acceptable. Where is the end of the 
NPP compatibility even wheil it satisfies the highest safety requirements? To answer these ques- 
tions i t  is importai~t  o  estima.te the admissibility of various measures suggested for increasing 
the safety of existing rea.ctors a.s well as for understanding and formulating the priorities in the 
development of new coi~ceptual designs. [3] 
Tlle main coilclusion from the calcula.tions presented in Section 4 is the following: 
equal efficiency in coal-fired power plant provided wit11 proper environmental protection 
equipment leads to a.n a.dditiona1 reserve in the capital cost of a NPP which could be spent 
for environmenta.1 aad safety protectioil of a present day NPP and its fuel cycle facilities. 
Tlle reserve for the European part of the USSR is estimated to  be 40-50% relative to  a NPP 
based on present day VVER-type nuclear reactors. 
The question arises whether this margin is ellough to  reach an acceptable level of safety. 
The investigation of the environmental costs of the normal operation of nuclear power plant and 
its fuel cycle facilities aad that of accidental risk from an off-reactor nuclear fuel cycle shows 
that  up to  a half of this inargin should be coilsumed for these purposes. So a margin of about 
25-55% still exists of present da.y levelized costs of electricity production from a NPP in the 
West Europea.11 part of the USSR which could be spent for the radical improvement of safety of 
a NPP per se. 
We restrict ourselves from judging how inucll new mea.sures t o  reduce accidental risk from a 
NPP will cost because there are now many uncertainties in these estimates. 
We finis11 by stating that there axe not large, but still some, reserves which could be spent for 
NPP safety and this challenges nuc1ea.r scientists and engineers to give nuclear power a second 
breath. 
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Table 4.9: Summary of Levelized Discounted Electricity Generation Costs for Variant (discount rate p = 0.1 l/yr.; lifetime 30 years), 
cop/(kW . hr) 
1 
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of Russia 
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Table 4.12: Upper permissible level of capital cost of NPP (equal efficiency of NPP and CPP) 
11 Urals 580 
I 
Economic region of the USSR 
11 Middle Volga 630 
I 
K at NPP of enhanced safety, 
roubles/kW 
(1 Rostov Region, East Ukraine 710 
I 1 West Ukraine, Moldova 735 
I I( North-West of Russia 680 
I 
Central Chernozem Region 680 
Table 5.1: Consumption of land and water for different stages of open NFC per 
G W(e) year 
NFC stage 
M i n i n g  a n d  
reprocessing 
of uranium ore 
0.2-O.l%U 
O.l%U 
Conversion to UF, 
Isotope 
enrichment 
of uranium 
Manufacturing of 
fuel assemblies 
NPP (per GW(e)): 
Tower cooling 
Ponds cooling 
water 
Long term storage 
and burial of spent 
fuel assemblies 
temporary 
20-60 
50-200 
0.13 
0.15 
0.02 
30-60 
300-800 
- 
Land,ha 
permanently 
2.0 
0.0 1 
- 
0.5 
0.5 
0.1 
Water, 
reusable 
2.0 
- 
0.01 
55 
0.03 
(1/3-2)ld 
106m3 
completely 
2.0 
0.03 
20-45 
17-30 
Table 5.2: Chemical products released to the environment with wastes at different 
NFC stages, ton/GW(e) . year. 
At the first stage about I t  of NH is released into the atmosphere. 
ALL other NFC releases (dumping) of chemical products are insignificant. 
It w u m e d -  that aJl electricity is produced at the coal power plants. 
Chemical products 
Stage 
Mining 
Ore processing 
Conversion to UF, ' 
Isotope enrichment 
of uranium 
Manufacturing of 
fuel assemblies 
Total 
Production of 
electricity consumed 
inNFC3 
sox 
10 
0.1 
9 
1 
30 
1400 
Chemical products 
Stage 
Mining 
Ore reprocessing 
Conversion to UF, ' 
Isotope enrichment 
of uranium 
Manufacturing of 
fuel assemblies 
Total 
Production of 
electricity consumed 
inNFC2 
Hydro 
carbons 
0.6 
2 
0.6 
0.1 
3.3 
10 
Fluorides 
0.07 
0.04 
0.01 
0.12 
NOx 
10 
14 
5 
9 
40 
800 
Dumping to hydrosphere 
CO 
0.2 
0.2 
24 
Sulphates 
14 
0.8 
Aerosol 
1 
2 
0.1 
0.6 
9 
13 
70 
40 (83 m3 of liquid wastes) 
1.5 x lo4 (liquid wastes) 
Fluorides 
0.2 
0.01 
Nitrates 
0.2 
0.9 
Chlorides 
4 
0.4 
Na + Ca 
14 
NH 
4 
0.02 
Table 5.3: Collective radiation doses for whole population of USSR created by continuous 
pollutant discharges from some links of NFC, man rem/MW(e) . yr 
* the continuation of inhalated Rn-222 to the value of dose constitutes 75%. 
Source 
NPP 
Fuel reprocessing 
Mining 
Hydrometallurgy 
Enrichment-uranium 
fuel fabrication 
Table 5.4: Collective radiation doses from NPPs (100 GW) and reprocessing plants as 
percentage (%) of that from natural background 
Collective dose 
Local 
(1-1OOkm) 
1.1 x 10" 
4.4 x 10" 
2.8 x lo4 
1.7 x 10" * 
7.2 x lo5 
Source 
NPPs 
Reprocessing plants 
Global 
(all country) 
6.8 x lo-' 
1.2 x lo-' 
Collective dose 
Local 
3 
12.8 
Global 
0.03 
0.05 
Table 5.5: Collective dose comrnittments SJd) of public exposure by radioactive releases 
(dumping) from NFC with LWR in normal operation 128,291. 
* local and regional doses ( s 1000krn) 
**  global dose (entire world) 
NFC stage 
Head-end stage (from mining to 
fuel manufacturing) 
NPP(VVER) 
Back-end (fuel element storage) 
Table 5.6: Cost of land alienated for non-agricultural needs, I d  roublelha. 
s E (a) 9 
man . rem/MW(E) . year 
r 0.01 
r 0.04* 
0.1** 
- 0 
11 Region of the USSR I 
North Russia (Karelia, Komi, Arkhangel'sk 
and Murmansk regions) 
Non-Chernozem region (Mari, Vladimir, 
Vologda, Niznegorod regions ...) 
Central and Chernozem regions: 
- Chernozem 
- other soils 
North Caucasus, Rostov region, Ukraine: 
- Chernozem 
- other soils 
Kaliningrad, Leningrad, Moscow regions 
South Urals, West and East Siberia, 
Far East of Russia 
Type of alienated land* 
* I - arable land, afforestation, personal plots, hayfields and pastures after 
melioration. 
11 - hayfields and pastures. 
Table 5.7: The discounted costs of safety, environmental protection for different NFC 
stages, 0.011 cop/kW h) 
* At the reactor stage of NFC the correct allowance for summarized damage from fog 
generation and consumption of natural resource is made. 
Stage 
Damage 
Resources: 
- land 
- water 
Chemical 
contamination 
Fog generation 
Loss of fish 
Radioactive 
contamination 
Total damage 
Head-end 
0.5-6 
0.03-0.1 
10"-10" 
- 
- 
0.006 
0.5-6 
NPP 
1-20 
0.3-6 
- 
0 - 20 
0 - 20 
0.06 
3.30* 
Back-end 
10"-10-2 
--- 
- 
- 
- 
0.01 
Total NFC 
2-25 
0.3-6 
10"-10-2 
0 - 20 
(0.5) 
0 - 20 
0.06 
4.40 
Table 6.1. Change in the VVER-1000 fuel composition under irradiation. 
Burnup 40 GW d/t 
Fuel composition 
before irradiation, 
kg 
U-238 
U-235 
Total 
Enrichment 
Amount of burnt fuel, 
kg 
956 
44 
lOOOkg 
4.4% 
Composition of 
irradiated fuel, 
kg 
U-238 
U-235 
Total 
U-238 
U-235 
U-236 
Plutonium 
Isotopes 
Np-237 
Am-24 1,243 
Cm-244 
Fission 
nuclides 
27,5 
32,l 
59.6kg 
928.5 
11.9 
5.6 
10.6 
0.5 
0.35 
0.02 
5 
42.1 
Table 6.2: Producers of enriched uranium 
*Deliveries for export 
Table 6.3: The comparison of the capital outlays for various enrichment techniques 
- 
Power cost 
$ 1986 
per SWU 
40-80 
70-80 
3-5 
Unknown 
Firm, 
country 
DOE, USA 
EURODIF, 
France 
URENCO: 
Britain, 
Netherlands, 
FRG 
Techsna b- 
export, 
USSR 
Process 
Gas diffusion 
Gas centrifuges 
Laser isotope 
separation 
Price 
$ 1986 
per SWU 
125-135 
90- 100 
115- 130 
100-125 
Process 
Gas 
diffusion 
Gas 
diffusion 
Gas 
centrifuges 
Gas 
diffusion 
Investment 
$ 1986 
per SWU/yr 
300-400 
300-400 
400-500 
Unknown 
Capital outlays, 
$ per SWU/yr 
High (300-400) 
High (400-500) 
Low (100) 
Capacity 
in 1985, 
lo6 SWU/yr 
27.3 
10.8 
2 
2.5* 
Consumption 
of electricity 
kWh/SWU 
High (2400) 
Low (100) 
Low (100) 
Consumption 
of labor and 
materials 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Table 6.4: The degree of potential risk from an accident to nuclear fuel cycle facilities 
Facility 
Open-cast mining of uranium 
II Underground mining of uranium II Underground leaching of uranium II Hydrometallurgy II Isotopic uranium enrichment 
Enrichment-uranium fuel assembly 
fabrication 
II MOX fuel assembly fabrication II Transportation of spent fuel 
Autonomous shallow interim storage 
of spent fuel 
Autonomous underground storage 
of spent fuel 
II Chemical reprocessing of spent fuel 

Mass of Uranium 
in facility at 
once, tonnes 
1 - open-case mines and mills 
2 - uranium enrichment 
3 - nuclear power plant 
4 - shipment of spent fuel (SF) 
5 - interim storage of SF 
6 - chemical reprocessing of SF 
Figure 2: Routine pollutions of the facilities of NFC 
